Original Research
Health Communications Trial with a Resistant Population to Increase Public Health
Compliance during a Pandemic
Alison Amoroso, M.Ed. 1, Carlos A. O. Pavão, DrPH 2, Russell E. Luke, M.A.3, Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D.3, Sean Richey, Ph.D.3, and
Shenandoah Evans, M.S.1
1

The Coleman Group, Inc.; 2Department of Health Policy and Behavioral Sciences, School of Public Health, Georgia State University;
Department of Political Science, Georgia State University

3

Corresponding Author: Alison Amoroso, M.Ed. • 6404 Ivy Lane, Suite 310, Greenbelt, MD 20770 • (470) 495-2521 • aliamoroso@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT
Background: Georgia has among the worst rates of COVID-19 hospitalization and death rates in the nation. Many identifying as
politically conservative resist public health mitigation measures, similar to populations in other politically conservative
geographical areas. There are limited peer-reviewed public health communications designed for this population. We aimed to
determine if an intervention using a fear appeal approach with efficacy during a pandemic can positively affect knowledge,
attitude, perception, and/or behavior (KAP) in Georgia with this population.
Methods: We delivered online video stimuli tailored to the geocultural characteristics of the target population. designed to
stimulate fear, encourage efficacy, and counter mis- and disinformation. It used three routes to affect participants: narrative, direct
messaging, and non-message cues. We measured risk aversion and conspiratorial ideation as moderating psychological factors
using psychological batteries. Census and voting data were used to identify a convenience sample of 829 Georgia adults in an
outer Atlanta suburb.
Results: Exposure to the video, moderated by risk aversion, resulted in increased recommended mitigating behavior to prevent
COVID-19 (13.7%, 95% CI: 2.7% to 24.7%,) and increased positive attitude toward the recommendations (7.7%, 95% CI: 5.9%
to 9.3%). Exposure to the video, moderated by conspiratorial ideation, resulted in an increase in perception of COVID-19 risk
(7.6% 95% CI: 1.8% to 13.5%) among participants.
Conclusions: An intervention using a fear appeal approach with efficacy during a pandemic can positively affect attitude and risk
perception of a politically conservative population. Scaling similar interventions with resistant geocultural populations has
promise of increasing adherence to public health recommendations. The moderating factor of conspiratorial ideation is relevant
given conspiracies during pandemics, such as COVID-19. This multidisciplinary study contributes to the extant literature by
providing insights of populations inﬂuenced by contrary political attitudes.
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INTRODUCTION
The public response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been
typical for widespread public health crises: denial,
scapegoating,
conspiracy
theories,
myths,
and
misinformation (Taylor, 2020; Quick, 2008; Rosenberg,
2009; Tuchman, 2011). Mis- and disinformation about
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has spread
further and deeper than factual evidence into “an infodemic”
(World Health Organization, 2020). The ongoing pandemic,
despite scientific evidence about how to prevent
transmission and save lives, challenged public health
scientists to understand how to intervene when resistance to
public health recommendations persisted. The United
Nations and WHO called for research to assist populations
who are at "high risk" for dis- and misinformation (2020).
Eschewing public health crisis communications best
practices (Seeger, 2006), the initial U.S. federal
communications response efforts in early 2020 consisted
largely of urging individual Americans to follow a set of

public health recommendations: socially distance, avoid
events with more than ten people, wash hands frequently,
and wear masks (added slightly later). Although
evidence-based, the recommendations did not meet
APEASE criteria for a successful intervention
(Affordability,
Practicability,
Effectiveness
and
cost-effectiveness, Acceptability, Side-effects and safety,
Equity) (see Appendix A for a discussion of deficits) (West
et al., 2020). Indeed, acceptability for these mitigations
eroded over time among the group under study; accordingly,
these populations displayed lower rates of adopting
mitigating behavior (Bekele, 2020; Allcott et al, 2020),
including vaccination (Societal Experts Action Network
[SEAN], 2021).
The Federal communications response was further
complicated throughout the year when Federal and many
state government messages conflicted with public health
recommendations, contributing to the publics' uncertainty

(Bolsen & Palm, 2022). Information that conflicts with
public health recommendations remains pervasive among
influencers popular in Georgia, which continues to lag in
vaccination rates and has higher infection rates (Ndugga et
al, 2021; CDC COVID Data Tracker, 2022). Uncertainty
gives rise to anxiety, misinformation, myths, and
conspiracies, which reinforce populations’ justification to
ignore or refuse to comply with public health
recommendations, or worse, fall prey to purposeful
manipulation (Taylor, 2020).
Conspiratorial thinking impeding public health campaigns is
not unknown in the U.S.; similar patterns of misinformation,
myths, and conspiracies emerged with efforts to mitigate the
spread of other infectious diseases. For example, the White
House under the Reagan administration resisted using risk
communications best practices during the HIV epidemic,
causing misinformation to spread, as well as ultimately,
deaths (Epstein, 1996). Influencers turned venereal disease
epidemics into public relations campaigns to prevent family
planning policies (Brandt, 1987) and tied the HPV vaccine
to teen sexual behavior, resulting in stubborn resistance to
vaccination uptake (Zimet et al., 2013) and thus lagging
progress to prevent cervical cancer in the U.S. compared
with other Western countries (WHO, Cervical Cancer,
2022).
Research in the U.S. indicated that much of the ongoing
group-specific resistance to public health recommendations
to prevent COVID-19 transmission diverged along partisan
lines, with Republican partisan identification and in-group
loyalty influencing what would otherwise be non-political
behaviors (Bekele et al., 2020; Gollwitzer et al., 2020). This
divergence was robust when local rates of COVID-19 cases,
hospitalizations, and deaths were accounted for; these
effects were also consistent for age, income, education, race,
ethnicity, and sex, and corresponded to the time leading up
to the study period and during the study period, even as
cases and deaths rose (Gollwitzer et al., 2020; Allcott et al.,
2020).
Geocultural Subgroups and Public Health
Developing health communications interventions for
geocultural sub-groups, including those characterized by
political identification, is important for several reasons.
Public health efforts generally are directed to either the
general population or populations defined by their
socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, age, or sex (Yuan et
al., 2019; Poland et al., 2005), but not political
identification, to our knowledge. Public health efforts that
emphasize social norm characteristics or determinants of
“place,” likewise do not include political attitudes or
partisanship in a geographic area. Research measuring
COVID-19 behaviors and attitudes, primarily fielded at the
national level, necessarily do not possess the requisite
granularity to increase understanding of subgroups and often
obscure normative influences in a geocultural place, e.g.,
how social ties strengthen partisanship (Poland et al., 2005;
Andrews, 2005; Mason & Wronski, 2018). Yet, populations
who are resistant to mitigation, sort largely into geographic

areas, as evidenced by vaccination rates in Georgia (Georgia
Department of Public Health, 2022; John Hopkins, 2022).
Communication campaigns to mitigate public health threats
are often based on the way experts think about risk,
calculating the “hazard times exposure = consequence,” but
not the way the public understands risk, as the subjective
perception of “the probability of something bad happening”
to me (Brown, 2014, p. A276–A279). Our study aimed to
address the “me,” and by extension, “mine,” in a tailored
intervention using a fear appeal approach with the extended
parallel process model (Witte, 1994; Leventhal & Roger,
1970), to increase perception of risk from the virus. This
approach endeavored to heighten perception of threat so the
participants would engage in self-preserving actions.
We employed moderate-level fear messaging, guided by
positive response efficacy (Bigsby & Albarracín, 2022),
which is shown to motivate behavior rather than overwhelm
and thus inhibit behavior (Witte & Allen, 2020). We chose
this approach for the intervention because it was
recommended by social and behavioral science expert
guidance to contain the pandemic, “Using Social and
Behavioral science to support COVID-19 pandemic
response,” published in Nature Human Behavior in the
beginning of the pandemic (Van Bavel, et al., 2020).
We also followed Bilali and Staub (2017), who
demonstrated a successful health communications
intervention for a resistant population within a
geographically bound area during a public health crisis
using culturally-aligned video. The technique of tailoring
interventions to geosocial groups was pioneered by
HIV/AIDS researchers to better understand why high-risk
populations, including those who received prevention
education, engage in risky sexual behaviors (Goedel &
Duncan, 2015; Contesse et al., 2020). Another successful
example of carefully geoculturally tailored interventions is
the Freedom from Chew campaign used in rural Virginia
(Wagner et al., 2018). Applying these principles to vaccine
acceptance, Hao and Shao (2022) noted an “individual
decision to take the vaccine [is] a function of their personal
characteristics and [is] also rooted in their home state’s
political, public health, and economic contexts,” and that
“knowledge of the profile … provides essential information
to leverage certain factors and maximize vaccine uptake.”
Nyhan et al. (2012) also demonstrated the importance of
social network perception in vaccine communications in the
Southeast.
Risk Aversion and Conspiratorial Ideation
We further examined the influence of two individual-level
psychological factors integral to people’s responses during a
pandemic. Risk aversion and conspiratorial ideation exert an
inordinate influence over a variety of attitudes and
behaviors, including health decisions and political views
(Miller, et al., 2016; O’Connor & Paunonen, 2016). We
therefore hypothesized these factors may moderate the
effect of an intervention. Risk aversion is an established
concept in psychology, public health, and economics.

Studies found individuals vary in the relative risk they
assign behaviors and that this individual variance was a
longitudinally stable, domain-specific psychological factor
that influenced an array of individuals’ attitudes and
behaviors (Arrow 1971; Pratt 1978; Dyer and Sarin 1982;
von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986; Yates and Stone 1992).
Communications research on COVID-19 demonstrated that
perception of risk from the virus predicted mitigating
behavior (Vacondio et al, 2021; Niepel et al, 2020).
Our conceptual conspiratorial thinking framework was
defined as a psychological disposition affecting the
likelihood that individuals would assign responsibility and
cause to an unevidenced and nebulous explanation over an
evidenced explanation based on people’s “underlying
worldview” (Geortzel, 1944, p. 740; Swami et al., 2011;
Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson, 2016, p. 2; Edelson et al.,
2017, p. 936). Douglas et al. (2019) found that belief in one
conspiracy was likely to be associated with belief in others,
which we posited is relevant to understanding who may be
more prone to conspiratorial ideation during a crisis brought
on by a highly contagious infectious disease. This
predisposition was shown to alter information processing
and reduce compliance with COVID-19 mitigation
behavior, including vaccination (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020;
Bertin et al, 2020; Georgiou et al, 2020; Goldberg & Richey,
2020; Marinthe et al, 2020; Romer & Jamieson 2020;
Loomba et al. 2021; Oleksy et al. 2021; Sallam et al. 2021;
Winter et al. 2021; Pummerer et al. 2022). If participants
responded to the battery question indicating they believed a
self-interested cabal runs the government, for example, we
hypothesized that they may be highly suspicious of federal
government mitigation recommendations and less likely to
adopt them.
Research Objectives
This study tested if a health communication intervention
using the fear appeal approach with efficacy, customized
according to the target population’s geocultural
characteristics, could address a gap in health
communications’ effectiveness with a resistant, geocultural
subset of the population, and thus positively influence its
knowledge, attitude, perception of risk, and/or behavior.
Based on the literature discussed above, we posited that the
intervention would be more effective for those high in risk
aversion or low conspiratorial ideation, even within a
resistant population. , and that the inclusion of these
psychological factors as significant moderators of mitigation
efforts may increase the efficacy of future public health
messaging by increasing our understanding of responses to
such efforts1. To test our concepts, we pre-registered
hypotheses, a survey questionnaire, and the research
methodology. The pre-registered2 hypotheses were
1

Our study also included a pre-exposure analysis demonstrating mediating
effects of higher conspiratorial belief and institutional trust in both federal
and state officials on compliance with public health recommendations. This
is submitted to a separate journal.
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This study was pre-registered with the Center for Open Science –
https://osf.io/kg53u.

1.)
Participants with higher values of risk aversion will
report more positive changes in one or more of knowledge,
attitude, perception (referred to as KAP), or behavior
following the intervention than participants with lower
values, all else equal.
2.)
Participants with lower values of conspiratorial
ideation will report more positive changes in one or more of
knowledge, attitude, perception, or behavior following the
intervention than participants with higher values, all else
equal.
METHODS
This research was approved by Georgia State University’s
Institutional Review Board. All procedures were in
accordance with the ethical standards of Georgia State
University’s Office of Research Integrity and Assurance
(IRB approval H21104) and with the 1964 Helsinki
declaration and its later amendments of comparable ethical
standards.
Participants and Setting
The study was conducted online with a convenience sample
of 829 English-speaking adults in a northern outer suburb of
Atlanta which primarily votes Republican and an adult
population
of approximately 517,389 (American
Community Survey, US Census, 2019). The inclusion
criteria were English-speaking adults, aged 18 years and
older, who voted on Republican ballots for the most recent
three elections, and who resided in the geosocial target area.
Consistent with resistant groups identified in national
surveys, the study population was similarly homogenous in
terms of income, age, and education; it was nearly all white
and Protestant Christian; and was 94% Republican, as
indicated by three years of voting records.
The geosocial area where the sample population resided was
geographically distinct, bound by highways and natural
barriers (Andrews, 2005). It had minimal migration into the
community and was in a socially overlapping area utilizing
the same schools, churches, and shopping areas. See Figure
1. This area was not subject to widespread local or Georgia
state policies mandating masks or social distancing that
would have exerted an influence on increased mitigating
behavior.
Due to the urgency of the pandemic, the sample was
selected to align with characteristics similar to those of
populations
less
accepting
of
public
health
recommendations than the majority of Americans. These
populations were consistently shown to resist adopting
behavioral mitigations according to relevant polling and
surveys conducted from the onset of the pandemic (SEAN,
2021; Fivethirtyeight Coronavirus Polls Tracker, 2021).

Figure 1
Geocoded Map of Participants in Study Area

Note: Portions of the study data are available online at www.colemangrpinc.com/protectinghealth. This platform allows various types of maps
and levels of examination and restricts inspection at the street level in order to protect personally identifiable identification. The question
displayed is answered by control and test groups: Are you concerned that you or a family member will get seriously ill/hospitalized?

Figure 2
Masking and Social Distancing Prevalence: General Population and Sample

Axios-Ipsos (Population)

Sample

Axios-Ipsos (Population)

Sample

Note: The general population relative frequency data was drawn from the July 31 - August 3, 2020 panel of the recurring Axios-Ipsos survey
(wave 19); n=1129, shortly before this study was fielded. The study frequency data was drawn September 2-5, 2020, n=829, wave 1, before
exposure. Axios-Ipsos data was accessed from SEAN (Societal Experts Action Network, 2020) at
https://covid-19.parc.us.com/client/index.html#/search.

Our sample similarly reported significantly lower rates of
following COVID-19 mitigation behaviors when compared
to the general public3, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Beginning in late August 2020, Cygnal, a polling company
specializing in reaching Republican voters4, recruited
potential participants by email and text. Using an online
link, it administered the survey with the video stimuli in
three waves: September 2-5, September 11-14, and
September 30-October 7, 2020. It randomly assigned those
who gave consent at the start of the first wave to either the
control or test group. Participants used their personal
electronic devices; all who consented were included. The
assignments were maintained across waves, and groups
were of approximately equal size throughout. To increase
retention, Cygnal offered a $5 Amazon gift card upon
completion of all waves and prompted participants with
three texts and emails containing the survey link prior to
each subsequent wave. The timing of the waves was
designed to test for durability and avoid an instrument
effect. Rapid online surveys are a promising method to
assess and track knowledge and perceptions among the
general public during fast-moving infectious disease
outbreaks (Geldsetzer, 2020).

group to the video stimuli. In wave three, both groups
answered a conspiratorial ideation battery, KAP and
behavior questions, and the COVID-19 threat question, but
were not exposed to the video stimuli. In order to test the
durability of the stimuli effect, wave three was conducted
after a time lag of two-three weeks. (See Appendix B for the
survey questionnaires.)
Quality and attention criteria were applied to ensure the
robustness and validity of responses. Participants were
excluded who: 1) failed the manipulation check by
incorrectly reporting information from the video (0%); 2)
chose conflicting personal experience answers (e.g., medical
test-confirmed diagnosis in wave 1 but no COVID-19
experience in wave 3 (3.9%); 3) did not participate for a
credible period of time to have earnestly completed each
wave (3.2%); and 4) had missing data on key factors of
interest (moved through without selecting answers) (1.8%).
Participants who answered ‘unsure’ were not included in
analyses based on that question, though they were not
excluded from the sample. Wave 1 N = 829; wave 2 N = to
291; wave 3 N = 181. The test and control group ratios
remained functionally equal throughout. Descriptive
statistics for all measures and number of responses are
available in Appendix C.

Assessments/Survey Instruments

Video

The intervention proceeded as follows: respondents from
both groups first answered a series of questions relating to
COVID-19 knowledge, attitude, perception (KAP), and
mitigation behaviors. The test group was then exposed to
the five-minute video and asked for a manipulation check to
ensure attention. The control group did not view the video
nor a replacement stimulus. Both groups then were asked to
rate the perceived threat of COVID-19, as a test of the
intervention’s efficacy; this ‘threat’ question was separate to
the perception question posed prior to the stimuli and
therefore was not included in discussion of KAP. Following
these steps, both groups were then asked a) if they or a
loved one had contracted COVID-19, and b) demographic
questions (race, age, sex, income, education).

The video stimuli followed general principles of the fear
appeals approach with efficacy and used well-established
factors to increase the perception of risk and to stimulate
fear: a) Awareness; b) Trust; c) Personal (Can it happen to
me?); d) Dread of suffering; e) Age-affected; f) Uncertainty;
g) Familiarity; h) Scope (Ropeik, 2004; Ropeik, 2011; Noar
et al, 2016).

The sequencing allowed for collection of KAP and behavior
measures prior to exposure to the experimental stimuli, so as
to not bias the responses. Personal experience with
COVID-19 was asked to account for any influence on key
measures. Demographic questions were asked after KAP
questions so as not to deter completion due to their sensitive
nature. Participants could leave the demographic questions
blank but were required to complete other questions.

The video stimuli utilized three routes to affect participants:
narrative, central route of direct messaging, and periphery
route of non-message cues (Dal Cin et al., 2004; Green,
2006; Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007). The narrative and direct
messaging included instructions for taking self-efficacious
behaviors consistent with public health recommendations
(masking and social distancing). The peripheral route was
designed to activate the psychology of in-group
affiliation/social identity with culturally applicable
influencers specific to the target population (Lunn et al.,
2020), corresponding to two types of characterizations. The
first type was based on Moral Foundations Theory and the
strong characteristics among politically conservative
populations: loyalty, authority, and purity (Haidt & Craig,
2004). Loyalty refers to standing with your group, family,

The second wave proceeded in the same manner, with the
addition of a risk aversion battery prior to exposing the test
3

The results of two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for both responses
to masking and social distancing were statistically significant and in the
expected direction. Masking: D=0.451, p<0.001; social distancing:
D=0.285, p<0.001.
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Highly rated by FiveThirtyEight (n.d. 2020).

Using “found footage,”5 the video was designed to
personalize risk among the target population, in contrast to
how experts often communicate a health risk as calculating
the hazard (Brown, 2014) or communicating a general
message of the threat. The video also countered prominent
misinformation widespread at the time of the experiment.
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Term for clips of video available in the public domain.

nation; authority as obedience to hierarchical relationships;
purity as abhorrence for disgusting things, actions.
The second type of characterization was based on the values
and social organization/norms characteristic of the
population. In our population, the South is commonly
characterized by the triad of service to ‘family, flag, and
God’ (Andrews, 2005). Family is self-evident; flag is
understood as a symbol of esteem or reverence for the
military, and God as Christian religion. These are
exemplified by rates higher than any other U.S. region of
military service, participation in organized religion, and of
the number of children in families (Pew Research Center,
2021).
The stimuli narrative likewise employed these
characterizations using peripheral cues. While ‘in-group’
authority figures and influencers told the story, the design
avoided images of messengers perceived negatively by this
population, such as CNN and U.S. government officials Dr.
Anthony Fauci, the Surgeon General, and those from the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It avoided
imagery that could further deny that COVID-19 could
happen to their ‘in-group’ (Cikara, et al., 2011), such as
images of New York scenes, people of color, and primarily
elderly people. In the second stimuli exposure, scenes were
shortened to maximize engagement and the opening scene
was slightly altered; all factors and visual elements
remained the same. See Appendix D for examples of the
perception of risk messages and the peripheral cues
corresponding to each characterization.

In our study, higher values indicated a positive KAP and/or
behavior related to COVID-19 and were defined as: a)
knowledge informed by scientific evidence of the severity
and transmissibility; b) attitude toward public health
recommendations; c) perceived risk of COVID-19; and d)
behaving in accordance with public health recommendations
for masking and social distancing. (See Figure 2.)
We measured knowledge through the average of two
questions capturing COVID-19 misinformation – similarity
to the flu and lack of threat to those with strong immune
systems. This measure was coded such that higher values
indicated higher levels of such misinformation. Attitude was
measured through the desire for others to socially distance.
Perception was measured by concern that ‘immediate family
members will get serious complications and/or be
hospitalized,’ capturing severity and transmissibility.
Behavior was measured through an identified latent factor
from confirmatory factor analysis formed from responses to
three questions pertaining to mask-wearing, social
distancing, and encouraging social distancing (eigenvalue of
1.65; proportion of variance explained 1.20). These
questions were consistent across waves, allowing for
longitudinal comparison (see Appendix C). However, these
variables did not correlate at the sufficient α values of 0.7
for an additive scale, thus this latent factor approach was
preferable to analyzing each behavioral measure
individually. The results of individual measure analysis
were substantively identical to those of the latent factor
approach; see Appendix E, Tables A-H.
Covariates of Risk Aversion and Conspiratorial Ideation

To construct the video and questionnaires, we used the same
language featured in large public interest panel surveys
published by SEAN since February 2020 (e.g. concern vs.
worry); the Social Distance Scale instrument (Prachthauser,
2020); and the U.S. Census Household Pulse Survey. We
documented and mirrored White House talking points that
were amplified by media influencers between mid-June and
August 31, 2020, to maximize political resonance. Some
questions did not yield significant results regarding the
hypotheses and were not discussed in this paper (see
Appendix C). We did not include a question about belief in
specific COVID-19 conspiracy theories to avoid priming
respondents.
KAP
KAP questionnaires are used when there is strong
sociocultural influence, religious expression, and/or political
stances that may influence resistance to comply, allowing
researchers to identify gaps and patterns in a sample of a
specific population which encourage or inhibit their ability
to adopt healthy behavior (Gumucio, 2011). We used P for
“perception,” instead of “practice,” an oft-used category,
and added behavior to provide more depth of understanding.
Measures/Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was conducted using R software, version
4.0.3 (2020-10-10; Bunny-Wunnies Freak Out.

We utilized established psychometric batteries to measure
the hypothesized covariates of risk aversion and
conspiratorial ideation. We abbreviated the risk aversion
battery developed by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002),
selecting those items with the highest factor loadings on
four pertinent risk perception subdomains: health/safety,
recreational, ethical, and social. We combined responses
into an additive index in lieu of a latent factor approach. The
results were substantively identical using either the additive
or latent factor approach. The scale was coded where higher
values indicated a higher aversion to participating in risky
behavior and lower values indicated more risk tolerance.
We abbreviated the conspiratorial ideation battery developed
by Brotherton, French, and Pickering (2013), excluding
personal well-being items that could have primed
participants to theories relating to COVID-19. Brotherton et
al theorize that conspiratorial ideation remains relatively
static over time and captures a propensity towards belief in
conspiracies beyond those in their battery. We over-selected
government malfeasance and control of information items
due to the subject matter under study, then selected items
based on their factor loadings (items 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, and
156). We constructed an additive index where higher values
denoted higher levels of conspiratorial ideation. Any
6

Government malfeasance, extraterrestrial cover-up, malevolent global
conspiracies, and control of information.

abbreviated battery will suffer from some degree of loss to
construct validity, but we viewed our abbreviation criteria as
informed by the original research and useful given the
subject matter.
Personal experience with COVID-19 was included in the
analysis to account for its inﬂuence, measured as a trinary
variable, where higher values indicated a higher level of
personal experience. We assumed participants who had
personally experienced COVID-19 were more likely to
adopt mitigating behaviors, and/or have increased KAP.
We used a series of linear regression models to analyze the
impact of video stimuli and the psychological covariates on
COVID-19 KAP and behaviors. We introduced interaction
terms between the psychological covariates and an indicator
variable for the treatment group to examine our
hypothesized moderation effects. A number of these models
exhibited heteroskedastic residual structures, as indicated by
Breusch-Pagan tests. To compensate, we applied the Efron
(1982) standard error calculation; we chose this variant of
robust standard errors for its greater efficiency in small
sample sizes (Long and Ervin, 2000).7 Although not ideal,
the robust standard error calculation was the optimal
approach given the data and sample size: a) the
Huber-White calculation remained efficient in low sample
sizes, b) there was potential for bias in a weighted approach.
Therefore, we excluded influential observations (studentized
residuals greater than five) from the specific model so as to
not bias the results. Our Hausman tests indicated that OLS
was appropriate for all models, instead of ordered logit
models, despite the potentially ordinal nature of some
variables under study. No other significant issues were
illuminated in post-estimation robustness checks. All
post-estimation robustness results are available upon
request. See Appendix E for full linear regression estimates
for all models. All effects discussed as significant were
statistically significant at the p<0.05 level, and whiskers
indicated 95% confidence intervals.
We analyzed the main effects via two-sample t-tests on both
an immediate measure of COVID-19 perception of risk
following first-wave exposure to video stimuli, and the
change in KAP and behaviors from wave 1 to wave 3
(“How much of a health risk is COVID-19 to you, or
someone close to you?”).
RESULTS
Our findings provide strong suggestive evidence for our
pre-registered hypotheses that the effect of the video stimuli
will be moderated by risk aversion. We found a positive
interaction effect between risk aversion and exposure.
Exposure to the video increased both COVID-19 attitude
and behavior from wave 1 to wave 3 for participants higher
in risk aversion, illustrated in Figure 3 (attitude: 7.7%, 95%
CI: 5.9% to 9.3%, p=0.023, N=173; behavior: 13.7%, 95%
7

This calculation is noted in the regression tables by square brackets,
whereas the normal standard error calculations are denoted with
parentheses.

CI: 2.7% to 24.7%, p=0.006, N=172). There was no
significant effect on knowledge or perception.
Contrary to our expectations, exposure to the video
increased COVID-19 perception of risk from wave 1 to
wave 3 for those higher in conspiratorial ideation. This is
illustrated in Figure 4 (7.6%, 95% CI: 1.8% to 13.5%,
p=0.012, N=176). The observed effect was likely because
those lower in conspiratorial ideation had a higher
perception of COVID-19 risk at baseline. Conspiratorial
ideation and perception of risk, as measured in the first
wave prior to exposure, were negatively correlated
(ρ=-0.2909, p=0.0001, N=176).
The observed change after exposure was more consequential
than our hypothetical expectation-- this intervention
significantly increased the perception of risk among those
most resistant to such change. Given that perception of risk
is a powerful predictor of behavioral change, it is possible –
though not shown herein – that such changes could lead to
behavioral changes (Van Bavel et al., 2020). The significant
change in perception of risk from waves 1 to 3 also
indicated the importance of repeated exposure to stimuli.
This was consistent with marketing campaign best practices
that recommended multiple exposures of the stimuli. There
was no significant effect on mitigation behavior, knowledge,
or attitude.
These outcomes measuring risk aversion and conspiratorial
ideation were more consequential given that no main effects
were observed. That is, the null results appeared to mask
variation within our sample along our hypothesized
psychological variables. The results of the main effects via
two-sample t-tests on both an immediate measure of
COVID-19 perception of risk following first wave exposure
to video stimuli, and the previously discussed change in
KAP and behaviors from wave 1 to wave 3 (“How much of
a health risk is COVID-19 to you, or someone close to
you?”) were: 4.547%, 95% CI: -0.135% to 4.682%,
p=0.057, N=729; knowledge: 1.158%, 95% CI: -4.341% to
6.656%, p= 0.678, N= 183; attitude: 0.052%, 95% CI:
-3.579% to 3.682%, p=0.978, N= 190; perception: 2.981%,
95% CI: -2.343% to 8.305%, p=0.271, N= 191; behavior:
3.088%, 95% CI: -4.679% to 4.893%, p=0.965, N= 190.)
We did not find an effect of personal experience with
COVID-19 on KAP or behaviors in any wave. This finding
was consistent with polls and surveys among people
resistant to getting vaccinated between February and July
2021 (SEAN, 2021).

Figure 3
Effect of Video Stimuli Exposure, Risk Aversion, and their Interaction

Figure 4
Effect of Video Stimuli Exposure, Conspiratorial Ideation, and their Interaction

DISCUSSION
The lack of main effects on the total sample highlighted
both the difficulty of influencing resistant populations and
the promise of our approach during a pandemic. By
designing our intervention to target relevant and stable
individual-level psychological factors among the
population, we were able to meaningfully affect subsets of a
resistant population. Our multidisciplinary approach (public
health, political science, psychology, private sector) allowed
for robust innovation to target a resistant population with
tailored messaging. This study contributes to the extant
literature by providing insights into successfully gaining
acceptance for public health recommendations among
populations resistant to mitigations and influenced by
political attitudes (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018).
We find that a geographically and culturally distinct
population in the South, resistant to adopting behaviors to
protect themselves and others from COVID-19, can be
motivated by a fear appeal communications intervention
during a pandemic and infodemic. The knowledge that the
effects of public health communications can be moderated
by individual psychological factors such as risk
aversion/seeking and conspiratorial ideation, provides
additional information from which to design effective
interventions.
This study demonstrates promise for similar interventions
given that health communications campaigns’ effects on
behavior are limited (the average is r=.09 with a 95% CI of
.07 to .10) and that there is even lower success for resistant
populations (Snyder et al., 2004; Mahajan & Peterson, 1985;
Rogers, 1983). Our results with this population were
especially notable given the target population’s influencers
promoted misinformation and conspiracies. Health
communications are important prevention tools as a small
effect can benefit large numbers of people, and as resistant
populations continue to stress health systems and take a toll
on families.
This experiment found a significant increase in positive
COVID-19 attitude, perception, and behavior as compared
to the control group among participants exposed to the
health communication video, moderated by risk aversion
and conspiratorial ideation. A significant positive behavior
change was meaningful due to the difficulty in changing
behavior. It was unsurprising that fear appeal messaging
significantly improved attitude and behavior among more
risk-averse persons; however, it is significant that this
occurred in such a resistant population as our sample.
It was also notable that our video stimuli increased the
perception of risk among participants higher in
conspiratorial ideation, perhaps the most difficult subset of
the population to meaningfully affect. Extending previous
findings of the fear appeal with efficacy approach (extended
parallel process model) in health communications (Witte,
1994) – that greater risk perception leads to more protective
behavior – we expect that a campaign designed with
additional exposure to stimuli might increase mitigating

behaviors amongst this subset (Clinton et al., 2017; Synder
et al., 2004; Tannenbaum et al., 2015; Brewer et al., 2015;
Witte & Allen, 2000).
Countering the widely circulating conspiracy theories,
especially “cures” and vaccine danger, with a stronger
conspiracy frame may prove more effective than focusing
on factual knowledge messaging as in our video. For
example, using messaging that the conspiracy theory is the
actual conspiracy. A similar narrative was used in the
successful anti-smoking Truth campaign aimed at
adolescents,
exposing
the
industry’s
purposeful
manipulation of them (where teens confront tobacco
marketing departments with lie detectors) (Healton, 2001).
Tailoring messaging to a segmented audience was also
recommended by Lewandowsky et al. (2012), who
researched techniques to counter conspiracies without
threatening someone's worldview.
We did not find our tailored fear appeal to be an effective
approach for risk-seeking individuals. While a logical
outcome, the effect of the participant's psychological
dispositions has not, to our knowledge, been studied. It was
possible that risk aversion/seeking was an understudied
factor in health communications campaigns, and effective
interventions could be pivotal for improving public health
among resistant populations (e.g., wearing helmets,
seatbelts, or protection from sexually transmitted
infections). Verma et al. (2021) suggested using the Nobel
Prize-winning prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) to market COVID-19 vaccines to risk-seeking
individuals who perceived a low probability of serious
consequences from contracting COVID-19 using gain and
loss frames. Future research should systematically explore
the effect of both risk aversion and conspiracy ideation,
perhaps among other psychological factors, on to the effects
of public health communications.
Limitations of this study include: 1) The large attrition after
Labor Day, between waves 1 and 2, may have reduced our
ability to detect differences. While it is not unusual to have a
large drop-off with online surveys, we did not increase the
incentive or otherwise account for the effect of summer
vacations ending, and participants who may have vied for
online school/telework Internet availability. 2) Exposure to
video stimuli was limited to two administrations. 3) Video
and audio quality relied on publicly available material. 4)
Engagement with the video could not be monitored in
person due to the pandemic’s distancing practices. 5)
Surveys present the possibility of self-selectivity bias. 6)
Due to the urgency of rising death rates during the
pre-vaccine period, minimal pre-testing of the video was
conducted. Stronger outcomes may have been achieved with
a larger budget to address attrition, marketing best practices
of three or more exposures, and a professionally produced
video with sufficient beta testing.

CONCLUSION
This research highlights the possibilities of tailoring public
health communications interventions to geographically and
culturally distinct areas. Absent widespread government
policies to curb an infectious disease crisis, such as highly
effective opt-out vaccination policies in schools and other
congregate settings (see APEASE discussion, Appendix A),
interventions affecting the social norm of subgroups can
achieve desired normative behavior (Campbell et al., 2008).
Given that many southern states have among the highest
transmission and lowest vaccination rates (John Hopkins,
2021; Albrecht, 2022), as well as a higher rate of
anti-masking and anti-vaccine sentiment (Albrecht, 2022),
interventions aimed at similar subgroups as the one we
studied could have propagating effects at containing
COVID-19.
To advance these findings and vaccine uptake, Census and
voter data can be similarly used to identify homogeneous,
geosocial populations affected by the infodemic (Forati &
Ghose, 2021), including in rural Georgia. It is our hope that
this multidisciplinary study will provide an additional health
communications method for policy leaders, public health
practitioners, community leaders, and researchers to
increase vaccination and other public health mitigations
during a pandemic. By utilizing a multidisciplinary
approach, this study expanded our knowledge of health
communication interventions for resistant populations.
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Appendix A: APEASE Criteria for Evaluating Intervention Approaches or Components
Criterion
A)
Acceptability8
B)

Practicability9

C)
D)
E)
F)

Effectiveness10
Affordability11
Spill-Over Effects12
Equity13

To What Extent…
is it judged to be acceptable by all key stakeholders?
can it be delivered as intended, at the scale intended and, in the
context, intended?
will it deliver the desired outcome in the target population?
can it be afforded within an acceptable budget?
is it likely to have additional negative or positive consequences?
is it likely to increase or decrease inequalities in society?

Note. ‘It’ refers to the intervention under evaluation.
.

Appendix B: Questionnaires (Waves 1, 2, 3)
WAVE 1

1.
Currently, how often do you interact with your neighbors?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 4)
o
Frequently
o
Occasionally
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)

Thinking about COVID-19, also known as the coronavirus ...
2.
On a scale of 1 - 7, with 1 being the least severe and 7 being the most severe, how big of a threat to peoples’ health is
COVID-19 in Georgia?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 8)
o
7
o
6
o
5
o
4
o
3
o
2
o
1
o
COVID-19 is not a threat in Georgia
o
Unsure (DNR)

3.
Do you think the threat of COVID-19 is being exaggerated or downplayed?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Very exaggerated
o
Somewhat exaggerated
o
Neither exaggerated nor downplayed
o
Somewhat downplayed
o
Very downplayed
o
Unsure (DNR)

4.
How concerned are you that you or an immediate family member will get serious complications and/or be hospitalized
due to COVID-19?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Very concerned
o
Somewhat concerned
o
Neither concerned nor unconcerned
o
Somewhat unconcerned
o
Very unconcerned
o
Unsure (DNR)

5.
Which of the following statements is closest to how you think Georgia should handle the COVID-19 pandemic?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
All public health measures to keep people safe should be mandatory
o
Some public health measures to keep people safe should be voluntary and some – such as wearing masks and social
distancing in public – should be mandatory
o
All public health measures to keep people safe should be voluntary
o
No public health measures are necessary
o
Unsure (DNR)
Below you will read several statements related to COVID-19. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement.
(RANDOMIZE Q7 - Q10)
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
AGREE
DISAGREE
(DNR)
Strng Smwht Nthr Smwht Strng Unsure
1
2
3
4
5
6
6.
7.
8.
9.

People with strong immune systems do not need to worry about COVID-19.
COVID-19 poses the same risk as the seasonal flu.
There will be a widely available vaccine for COVID-19 by the end of the year.
During this pandemic, I wish people who are not a part of my household would stay at least six feet away from me.

10.
Once a COVID-19 vaccine is available in the U.S., which of the following statements most closely matches what you’ll
do?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
I will get the vaccine immediately
o
I will get the vaccine when I get around to it
o
I will get the vaccine eventually, but I’ll wait to make sure it is safe
o
I will not get the vaccine because COVID-19 is not a real danger
o
I will not get the vaccine because I don’t think vaccines are safe in general
o
Unsure (DNR)

11.
In the past month, how many times have you attended a group event with more than 10 people in attendance, such as a
religious gathering, party, funeral, wedding, sporting event, etc.?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
More than 10 times in the past month
o
7 - 10 times in the past month
o
3 - 6 times in the past month
o
1 - 2 times in the past month
o
I have not attended a group event with more than 10 people in attendance in the past month
o
Unsure (DNR)

12.
When out in public and around people, how often do you wear a mask or face covering?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
o
Most of the time
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)

13.
Which of the following reasons best describe why you don’t regularly wear a mask or face covering? You may select up
to three options.
MULTI SELECT UP TO 3 (RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 11)
o
Other people in the area were not wearing masks
o
I was concerned about what others would think of me
o
Masks are awkward/uncomfortable
o
Masks cannot protect me or stop the spread of COVID-19
o
There is little risk that I can contract or spread COVID-19
o
Masks are unnecessary because COVID-19 is not a threat
o
I don’t care about the risks
o
Being forced to wear a mask violates my personal freedom
o
The government doesn’t require masks
o
I forget to bring a mask
o
Wearing a mask is a greater threat to my health than COVID-19
o
Other (please specify)
o
Unsure (DNR)

14.
When out in public and around people, how often do you socially distance by staying six or more feet away from others?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
o
Most of the time
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)

15.
Which of the following reasons best describe why you don’t regularly socially distance by staying six or more feet away
from others? You may select up to three options.
MULTI SELECT UP TO 3 (RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 10)
o
Other people in the area were not socially distancing
o
I was concerned about what others would think of me
o
Socially distancing is awkward/uncomfortable
o
Socially distancing cannot protect me or stop the spread of COVID-19
o
There is little risk that I can contract or spread COVID-19
o
Socially distancing is not necessary because COVID-19 is not a threat
o
I don’t care about the risks
o
Being forced to socially distance violates my personal freedom
o
The government doesn’t require social distancing
o
I forget to socially distance
o
Other (please specify)
o
Unsure (DNR)

16.
How often do you ask or encourage your family or friends to wear a mask and/or stay six feet away from others for their
own safety?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
o
Most of the time
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never

o

Unsure (DNR)

17.
Generally, when you are in public, how many of the people around you are wearing masks and/or social distancing by
staying at least six feet away from others?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Practically everyone
o
Not everyone, but more than half
o
Some people, but less than half
o
Practically no one
o
I never go out
o
Unsure (DNR)

18.
Which of the following statements most closely reflects how your shopping habits have changed due to COVID-19, if at
all?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
I go to the store more often
o
My shopping habits haven’t changed – I go to the store the same amount
o
I go to the store less often
o
Unsure (DNR)
19.

CONTROL GROUP: SKIP TO DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

TEST GROUP ONLY:
Now you will be shown a short video about COVID-19 …<<SHOW VIDEO>>
20.

Was any part of the video new information to you? You may select up to three options.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Seeing that healthy young people have suffered
Hallucinations among people who were placed in a medical coma suffer
Seeing that people who downplayed the risk of getting the virus got seriously ill
The Army General’s statements of how to be vigilant to stop the virus
Learning that people who worked at the grocery store infected their family
The doctor’s description of why the virus is much worse than the fluOther (please specify)
None of the above
Unsure (DNR)

21.
Are you or someone in your household considered an essential worker, such as a worker in the medical field, home care,
manufacturing, the service industry, etc.?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
Yes, I am
o
Yes, someone in my household is
o
No

22.
How many people, including yourself, do you have medical responsibility over such as children, a disabled or elderly
relative, etc.?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
1
o
2
o
3
o
4
o
More than 4

23.
What are your primary sources for trustworthy news about COVID-19? You may select up to three options.
MULTI SELECT UP TO 3 (RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 9)
o
Friends and family
o
Local TV news
o
CNN cable TV
o
MSNBC cable TV
o
FOX News cable TV
o
Radio
o
Facebook
o
Twitter
o
YouTube
o
Print and/or online newspapers
o
Other online publications (please specify)
o
Other
o
I don’t follow news related to COVID-19
o
Unsure (DNR)

24.
How often do you read, watch, or listen to news related to COVID-19?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 6)
o
Once a month or less
o
A few times a month
o
Once a week
o
Several times a week
o
Once a day
o
More than once a day
o
Unsure (DNR)

25.
Regardless of whether or not you’re currently able to meet in person, are you an active member of a community
organization such as a church group, a service organization, business organization, sports/recreation team, neighborhood
association, or other similar group?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 2)
o
Yes
o
No

26.

What is your annual household income?

o
o
o
o

Less than $17,000
Less than $50,000
$50,000 - $100,000
More than $100,000

27.
With what you know now, on a scale of 1 - 7, with 1 being an insignificant risk, and 7 being a serious risk, how much of
a health risk is COVID-19 to you, or someone close to you?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 8)
o
7
o
6
o
5
o
4
o
3
o
2
o
1
o
COVID-19 is not a health threat in general
o
Unsure (DNR)

28.
Last question! Reminder: This is a confidential survey and strictly for research purposes. Your information will not be
released. Do you believe you or someone in your household, a friend, or a coworker has been infected with COVID-19 at any
time?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
Yes, a medical test confirmed COVID-19
o
Yes, the symptoms were consistent with the virus but not confirmed by a test
o
No, I do not believe myself or an immediate family member has had COVID-19
o
Unsure (DNR)
WAVE 2

Thinking about COVID-19, also known as the coronavirus ...
1.
How concerned are you that you or an immediate family member will be infected with COVID-19?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Very concerned
o
Somewhat concerned
o
Neither concerned nor unconcerned
o
Somewhat unconcerned
o
Very unconcerned
o
Unsure (DNR)

2.
How concerned are you that you or an immediate family member will get serious complications and/or be hospitalized
due to COVID-19?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Very concerned
o
Somewhat concerned
o
Neither concerned nor unconcerned
o
Somewhat unconcerned
o
Very unconcerned
o
Unsure (DNR)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or behavior.
(RANDOMIZE Q3 - Q10)(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)

Very Likely Likely Not Sure Unlikely
1
2
3
4
5
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Very Unlikely

Prefer Not to Answer (DNR)
6

Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat.
Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen.
Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.
Going on a two-week vacation in a foreign country without booking accommodations ahead.
Illegally copying a piece of software.
Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.
Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different opinion.
Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion.

Below you will read several statements related to COVID-19. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement.
(RANDOMIZE Q11 - Q15)
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
AGREE
DISAGREE
(DNR)
Strng Smwht Nthr Smwht Strng Unsure
1
2
3
4
5
6
11.
I trust COVID-19-related news from official Georgia government sources, such as the Georgia Department of Public
Health and the Governor’s Office.
12.
I trust COVID-19-related news from official national government sources, such as the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
13.

People with strong immune systems do not need to worry about COVID-19.

14.

COVID-19 poses the same risk as the seasonal flu.

15.

During this pandemic, I wish people who are not a part of my household would stay at least six feet away from me.

16.
Once a COVID-19 vaccine is available in the U.S., which of the following statements most closely matches what you’ll
do?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
I will get the vaccine immediately
o
I will get the vaccine when I get around to it
o
I will get the vaccine eventually, but I’ll wait to make sure it is safe
o
I will not get the vaccine because COVID-19 is not a real danger
o
I will not get the vaccine because I don’t think vaccines are safe in general
o
Unsure (DNR)

17.
In the past month, how many times have you dined in a restaurant, bar, café, etc?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
More than 10 times in the past month
o
7 - 10 times in the past month
o
3 - 6 times in the past month
o
1 - 2 times in the past month
o
I have not dined out in the past month
o
Unsure (DNR)

18.
When out in public and around people, how often do you wear a mask or face covering?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
[SKIP Q19]

o
o
o
o
o

Most of the time [SKIP Q19]
Some of the time
Rarely
Never
Unsure (DNR)
[SKIP Q19]

19.
Which of the following reasons best describes why you don’t regularly wear a mask or face covering?
(RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Masks are awkward/uncomfortable
o
Masks cannot protect me or stop the spread of COVID-19
o
There is little risk that I can contract or spread COVID-19
o
Being forced to wear a mask violates my personal freedom
o
Wearing a mask is a greater threat to my health than COVID-19
o
Other (please specify)
o
Unsure (DNR)

20.
When out in public and around people, how often do you socially distance by staying six or more feet away from others?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
[SKIP Q21]
o
Most of the time [SKIP Q21]
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)
[SKIP Q21]

21.
Which of the following reasons best describes why you don’t regularly socially distance by staying six or more feet away
from others?
(RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 4)
o
Socially distancing is awkward/uncomfortable
o
Socially distancing cannot protect me or stop the spread of COVID-19
o
There is little risk that I can contract or spread COVID-19
o
Being forced to socially distance violates my personal freedom
o
Other (please specify)
o
Unsure (DNR)

22.
How often do you ask or encourage your family or friends to wear a mask and/or stay six feet away from others for their
own safety?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
o
Most of the time
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)

23.
Generally, when you are in public how many of the people around you are wearing masks and/or social distancing by
staying at least six feet away from others?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Practically everyone

o
o
o
o
o

Not everyone, but more than half
Some people, but less than half
Practically no one
I never go out
Unsure (DNR)

24.
Which of the following statements most closely reflects how your shopping habits have changed due to COVID-19, if at
all?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
I go to the store more often
o
My shopping habits haven’t changed – I go to the store the same amount
o
I go to the store less often
o
Unsure (DNR)
CONTROL GROUP: SKIP TO DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

TEST GROUP ONLY:
Now you will watch the same short video about COVID-19 that you watched about a week ago. Please pay close attention, as
there will be a question about the information.
<<SHOW VIDEO>>
25.

What information do you recall from the video?

o
o
o
o
o
o

The body bags are from a country in Europe
There is a hospital bed shortage in Georgia
Only COVID-19 patients get ICU delirium
All of the above
None of the above
Unsure (DNR)

26.
On a scale of 1 - 7, with 1 being an insignificant risk, and 7 being a serious risk, how much of a health risk is COVID-19
to you, or someone close to you?
o
7
o
6
o
5
o
4
o
3
o
2
o
1
o
COVID-19 is not a health threat in general
o
Unsure (DNR)

27.
Last question! Reminder: This is a confidential survey and strictly for research purposes. Your information will not be
released. Do you believe you or someone in your household, a friend, or a coworker has been infected with COVID-19 at any
time?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
Yes, a medical test confirmed COVID-19
o
Yes, the symptoms were consistent with the virus but not confirmed by a test
o
No, I do not believe myself or an immediate family member has had COVID-19

o

Unsure (DNR)

WAVE 3

Thinking about COVID-19, also known as the coronavirus ...
1.
How concerned are you that you or an immediate family member will be infected with COVID-19?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Very concerned
o
Somewhat concerned
o
Neither concerned nor unconcerned
o
Somewhat unconcerned
o
Very unconcerned
o
Unsure (DNR)

2.
How concerned are you that you or an immediate family member will get serious complications and/or be hospitalized
due to COVID-19?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Very concerned
o
Somewhat concerned
o
Neither concerned nor unconcerned
o
Somewhat unconcerned
o
Very unconcerned
o
Unsure (DNR)

3.
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?
o
o
o
o

Most people can be trusted
Can’t be too careful
Depends
Unsure (DNR)

4.

Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

o
o
o
o

Would take advantage
Would try to be fair
Depends
Unsure (DNR)

5.

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or are they mostly looking out for themselves?

o
o
o
o

Try to be helpful
Just look out for themselves
Depends
Unsure (DNR)

Below you will read several statements related to COVID-19. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement.
(RANDOMIZE Q6 - Q9) (FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)

AGREE
DISAGREE
(DNR)
Strng Smwht Nthr Smwht Strng Unsure
1
2
3
4
5
6
6.

People with strong immune systems do not need to worry about COVID-19.

7.

COVID-19 poses the same risk as the seasonal flu.

8.

There will be a widely available vaccine for COVID-19 by the end of the year.

9.

During this pandemic, I wish people who are not a part of my household would stay at least six feet away from me.

10.
Once a COVID-19 vaccine is available in the U.S., which of the following statements most closely matches what you’ll
do?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
o
o
o
o
o

I will get the vaccine immediately
I will get the vaccine when I get around to it
I will get the vaccine eventually, but I’ll wait to make sure it is safe
I will not get the vaccine because COVID-19 is not a real danger
I will not get the vaccine because I don’t think vaccines are safe in general
Unsure (DNR)

11.
In the past two weeks, how many times have you attended a group event with more than 10 people in attendance, such as
a religious gathering, party, funeral, wedding, sporting event, etc.?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 4)
o
More than 5 times in the past two weeks
o
3 - 4 times in the past two weeks
o
1 - 2 times in the past two weeks
o
I have not attended a group event with more than 10 people in attendance in the past two weeks
o
Unsure (DNR)

12.
In the past two weeks, how many times have you dined in a restaurant, bar, café, etc?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 4)
o
More than 5 times in the past two weeks
o
3 - 4 times in the past two weeks
o
1 - 2 times in the past two weeks
o
I have not dined out in the past two weeks
o
Unsure (DNR)

13.
When out in public and around people, how often do you wear a mask or face covering?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
[SKIP Q14]
o
Most of the time [SKIP Q14]
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)
[SKIP Q14]

14.
Which of the following reasons best describes why you don’t regularly wear a mask or face covering?
(RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Masks are awkward/uncomfortable

o
o
o
o
o
o

Masks cannot protect me or stop the spread of COVID-19
There is little risk that I can contract or spread COVID-19
Being forced to wear a mask violates my personal freedom
Wearing a mask is a greater threat to my health than COVID-19
Other (please specify)
Unsure (DNR)

15.
When out in public and around people, how often do you socially distance by staying six or more feet away from others?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
[SKIP Q16]
o
Most of the time [SKIP Q16]
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)
[SKIP Q16]

16.
Which of the following reasons best describes why you don’t regularly socially distance by staying six or more feet away
from others?
(RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 - 4)
o
Socially distancing is awkward/uncomfortable
o
Socially distancing cannot protect me or stop the spread of COVID-19
o
There is little risk that I can contract or spread COVID-19
o
Being forced to socially distance violates my personal freedom
o
Other (please specify)
o
Unsure (DNR)

17.
How often do you ask or encourage your family or friends to wear a mask and/or stay six feet away from others for their
own safety?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Always
o
Most of the time
o
Some of the time
o
Rarely
o
Never
o
Unsure (DNR)

18.
Generally, when you are in public how many of the people around you are wearing masks and/or social distancing by
staying at least six feet away from others?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 5)
o
Practically everyone
o
Not everyone, but more than half
o
Some people, but less than half
o
Practically no one
o
I never go out
o
Unsure (DNR)

You’re almost done! There is often debate about whether or not the public is told the whole truth about various important issues.
Please indicate how true you believe each statement to be.
(RANDOMIZE Q19 - Q26)

NOT TRUE
TRUE
Def
Prob
Not Prob
Def
Unsure (DNR)
1
2
3
4
5
6
19.
The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret.
20.

The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control world politics.

21.

Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public.

22.

The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement.

23.

Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public.

24.

New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed.

25.

The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity.

26.

A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest.

27.
On a scale of 1 - 7, with 1 being an insignificant risk, and 7 being a serious risk, how much of a health risk is COVID-19
to you, or someone close to you?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 8
o
7
o
6
o
5
o
4
o
3
o
2
o
1
o
COVID-19 is not a health threat in general
o
Unsure (DNR)

28.
Last question! Reminder: This is a confidential survey and strictly for research purposes. Your information will not be
released. Do you believe you or someone in your household, a friend, or a coworker has been infected with COVID-19 at any
time?
(FLIP OPTIONS 1 - 3)
o
Yes, a medical test confirmed COVID-19
o
Yes, the symptoms were consistent with the virus but not confirmed by a test
o
No, I do not believe myself or an immediate family member has had COVID-19
o
Unsure (DNR)

Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Variable

Mean

Median

S. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Treatment Group

0.467

0

0.499

0

1

829

Risk Aversion

3.807

3.875

0.546

2.375

5

303

Conspiratorial Ideation

2.598

2.500

0.838

1

5

177

Social Trust

2.232

2.333

0.559

1

3

188

Institutional Trust: State

3.401

4

1.202

1

5

307

Right Wing News Consumption

0.375

0

0.485

0

1

820

Knowledge: Wave 1

3.044

3

1.292

1

5

786

Knowledge: Wave 2

3.424

3.5

1.189

1

5

303

Knowledge: Wave 3

3.458

3.5

1.221

1

5

190

Knowledge Change: Wave 1 to 2

0.345

0

1.108

-4

4

267

Knowledge Change: Wave 2 to 3

-0.003

0

0.915

-4

3

175

Knowledge Change: Wave 1 to 3

0.354

0

0.909

-2

3

185

Attitude: Wave 1

3.439

4

1.454

1

5

808

Attitude: Wave 2

3.683

4

1.362

1

5

309

Attitude: Wave 3

3.798

4

1.297

1

5

193

Attitude Change: Wave 1 to 2

0.135

0

1.223

-4

4

281

Attitude Change: Wave 2 to 3

0.101

0

1.092

-4

4

179

Attitude Change: Wave 1 to 3

0.276

0

1.014

-4

4

192

Perception: Wave 1

2.915

3

1.402

1

5

825

Perception: Wave 2

2.975

3

1.407

1

5

316

Perception: Wave 3

2.820

3

1.426

1

5

194

Perception Change: Wave 1 to 2

0.024

0

1.606

-4

4

289

Perception Change: Wave 2 to 3

-0.150

0

1.758

-4

4

180

Perception Change: Wave 1 to 3

-0.104

0

1.496

-4

4

193

Behavior Factor: Wave 1

0.009

0.213

0.880

-2.371

1.074

772

Behavior Factor: Wave 2

0.011

0.197

0.898

-2.543

1.038

304

Behavior Factor: Wave 3

-0.002

0.184

0.891

-2.540

1.092

192

Behavior Change: Wave 1 to 2

-0.049

-0.036

0.589

-2.220

2.469

277

Behavior Change: Wave 2 to 3

0.026

0.041

0.489

-2.381

1.829

175

Behavior Change: Wave 1 to 3

-0.023

0.018

0.392

-1.249

1.160

192

Norm Perception: Wave 1

3.088

3

0.786

1

4

764

Norm Perception: Wave 2

3.103

3

0.758

1

4

300

Norm Perception: Wave 3

3.107

3

0.789

1

4

187

Norm Change: Wave 1 to 2

-0.041

0

0.727

-3

2

271

Norm Change: Wave 2 to 3

-0.006

0

0.844

-3

3

168

Norm Change: Wave 2 to 3

-0.070

0

0.743

-3

2

186

Explanatory Variables

Outcome Variables

Appendix D: Video Stimuli Examples of the Fear Appeal EPPM Approach
Target population: Resistant group in the geosocial area; politically conservative.
Central messages: Examples of the direct messaging to elicit fear and increase perceptions of risk (as defined by Ropeik[1, 2])
are explained below.
Peripheral messages: Influencers, images, and testimonials chosen to align with elements characteristic of the target population
are identified below. These include: 1) loyalty, authority, purity (abhorrence for disgusting things) as per the Moral Foundations
Theory; 2) flag (military), family; 3) demographic affinities.
Narrative: Show your loyalty to your country and family by joining in winning the war against COVID-19.
All treatment narrative and imagery in the video were designed to elicit fear based on the characteristics of the target population.
The overarching narrative is that the US is in a war, and the video aims to engage viewers to join in to show their loyalty to their
country and family. Direct messaging activates self-efficacy to protect themselves/family by demonstrating how viewers can join
the war effort against COVID-19. Stimuli are all found footage and audio on YouTube.
1.
Ropeik D. Consequences of fear. Science and Society. 2004;5(1) 56-60. doi:10.1038/sj.embor.7400228.
2.
Ropeik D. The psychology of risk perception. Harvard Health website. Accessed June, 21 2011.
https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/the-psychology-of-risk-perception.
A) Awareness. Media coverage of high-profile disasters, often saturating the news, raises awareness of particular risks more than
others.

Central message(s): Tucker Carlson contradicts the FOX coverage downplaying COVID-19 and says it is very dangerous.
Peripheral cue(s): Influencer among target group.

B) Trust. When people trust the officials providing information about a particular risk or the process used to assess risk.

Central message(s): Doctor gently explains that COVID-19 is highly transmissible - much more than the flu. Supporting graphics to explain.
Peripheral cue(s): White doctor. University of Florida is popular and may be a positive influencer in the area. Doctors are authority figures.

C) Personal: Any risks that affect people personally are more frightening than those that affect strangers.

Central message(s): Narrator says he was a healthy 18-year-old athlete, thought COVID-19 couldn’t make him sick. Counters narrative of
strong immune systems.
Peripheral cue(s): Two white young men. Connotations of family and protection of young and vulnerable. Hospital scenes to illicit visceral
reaction of disgust.

Central message(s): Hospitals in your area are strained, personal threat from falling ill.
Peripheral cue(s): Local news channel from catchment area can be an influencer.

Central message(s): Testimonial of matriarch saying they had planned to get better together.
Peripheral cue(s): White, Southern family, long-term marriage.

D) Dread. Events that invoke dread — such as drowning or being eaten alive — scare people more than those that do not.

Central message(s): Doctors and testimonials in scenes about hallucinations as a side effect of being on a ventilator (e.g snakes being put into
their arms)
Peripheral cue(s): White patients, family (mother giving testimonial); doctor as authority.

Caption message(s): Doctor explains long-term effects of patients’ difficulty earning a living.
Peripheral cue(s): Doctor as authority.

E) Age affected: Risks are more frightening when they affect children.

Central message(s): Small child in a hospital with COVID-19 tells his mother he doesn’t feel well.
Peripheral cue(s): White child; family.

F) Uncertainty: Events inspire more fear when the risks are simply unknown.

Central message(s): Thinking COVID-19 was a hoax, Florida man was shocked and scared when he and his wife became seriously ill.
Challenge to authority: COVID-19 is not what he was told it was.
Peripheral cue(s): White man; southerner. Family message. Images to elicit disgust.

G) Familiarity: New threats are perceived to be more dangerous than more familiar ones.

Central message(s): Doctor says this is a new disease and there is not much information about how it spreads, it is not the flu.
Peripheral cue(s): White doctor from University of Florida, an influencer in the area. Doctors are authority figures.

Central message(s): The disease is unknown, and there is no cure or vaccine. Testimony asks for loyalty to nation.
Peripheral cue(s): Influencer is an authority figure — a general and a doctor.

8) Scope: Cataclysmic events, capable of killing many people at the same time, are scarier than chronic conditions.

Central message(s): Make-shift wards for hospital overflow.
Peripheral cue(s): Images of body parts of dead people challenge purity, evoke disgust.

Central message(s): Narration states that the U.S. is losing the war, thousands are dying, evoking “flag” and “loyalty.”
Peripheral cue(s): Images of body bags challenge purity, evoke disgust.

Central message(s): Mass gravesite; funerals not feasible.
Peripheral cue(s): Video caption states it’s the USA, evoking “flag” and loyalty. Image of burial pit challenges purity, evokes disgust.

9) Flag

Central message(s): A dead US soldier's coffin draped in the U.S. flag.
Peripheral cue(s): Image cues demographic affinity of white soldiers taking recommended masking behavior.

10) Family

Central message(s): Survivor explaining his wife has been on a ventilator for three weeks.
Peripheral cue(s): White family; Southerners.

11) Efficacy

Central message(s): Survivor explaining suffering and entreats people: Be careful, wear a mask, protect yourself, protect your kids, protect your
family”
Peripheral cue(s): White man speaking; family loyalty; white family.

Central message(s) Military doctor provides instruction about how to mitigate, mask, distancing. Ad Council graphic shown while officer is
speaking.
Peripheral cue(s): Military officer and doctor are authority figures; decorated military general evokes “flag” and loyalty to nation.

Appendix E: Results of Linear Regression Analyses (A-H)
Table A. Effect of Risk Aversion, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Behaviors
Behaviors:
Behaviors:
Behaviors:
Behavior Change: Behavior Change:
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 1 to Wave 2
Wave 2 to Wave 3
Treatment
1.168
0.095
-0.209
-0.647
-0.227
(0.763)
[0.776]
(0.988)
(0.542)
(0.525)
Risk Aversion
0.390***
0.445***
0.237
0.034
-0.180**
(0.115)
[0.108]
(0.156)
(0.082)
(0.083)
Interaction
-0.283
-0.036
0.071
0.166
0.076
(0.197)
[0.195]
(0.257)
(0.140)
(0.137)
Constant
-1.429***
-1.666***
-0.893
-0.183
0.691**
(0.437)
[0.420]
(0.590)
(0.311)
(0.316)

Behavior Change:
Wave 1 to Wave 3
-1.271**
[0.523]
-0.138
[0.096]
0.330**
[0.135]
0.488
[0.377]

Observations
Adjusted R2

172
0.028

276
0.036

295
0.060

172
0.012

269
0.001

168
0.018

Note: Dependent variable is predicted latent factor of COVID-19 behaviors. Treatment denotes exposure of treatment group to
video stimuli. Risk aversion scale abbreviated from Weber, Blais, and Betz.1 Standard errors in parentheses. Efron2 variant standard
errors in brackets to account for heteroskedastic residual structure. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
1. Weber EU, Blais AR, Betz NE. A domain‐specific risk‐attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal
of Behavioral Decision Making. 2002;15(4):263-290. doi:10.1002/bdm.414.
2. Efron B. Maximum likelihood and decision theory. The Annals of Statistics. 1982; 10(2): 340-356.
doi:10.1214/aos/1176345778.
Table B. Effect of Risk Aversion, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Knowledge
Knowledge
Knowledge
Knowledge:
Knowledge:
Knowledge:
Change: Wave 1 to Change: Wave 2 to
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 2
Wave 3
Treatment
0.782
1.114
0.598
0.432
0.863
(1.175)
(1.028)
(1.406)
(1.019)
(1.060)
Risk
**
***
0.444
0.428
0.349
0.021
-0.012
Aversion
(0.179)
(0.158)
(0.219)
(0.155)
(0.165)
Interaction
-0.170
-0.249
-0.087
-0.078
-0.236
(0.303)
(0.265)
(0.365)
(0.263)
(0.275)
Constant
1.329*
1.715***
2.047**
0.193
0.082
(0.677)
(0.599)
(0.829)
(0.589)
(0.625)
Observations
Adjusted R2

266
0.021

295
0.024

171
0.017

260
-0.008

170
-0.010

Knowledge
Change: Wave 1 to
Wave 3
-1.930*
(1.031)
-0.270*
(0.162)
0.527*
(0.268)
1.339**
(0.611)
166
0.009

Note: Dependent variable is additive index of COVID-19 knowledge. Treatment denotes exposure of treatment group to video
stimuli. Risk aversion scale abbreviated from Weber, Blais, and Betz1. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table C. Effect of Risk Aversion, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Attitudes
Attitudes:
Attitudes:
Attitudes:
Attitudes Change: Attitudes Change:
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 1 to Wave 2
Wave 2 to Wave 3
Treatment
2.304*
0.392
0.557
-1.161
-0.374
(1.266)
[1.293]
(1.437)
(1.113)
(1.238)
Risk Aversion
0.554***
0.573***
0.462**
0.009
-0.091
(0.194)
[0.183]
(0.224)
(0.171)
(0.194)
*
Interaction
-0.554
-0.120
-0.092
0.272
0.089
(0.327)
[0.328]
(0.374)
(0.287)
(0.322)
Constant
1.379*
1.542**
1.991**
0.158
0.437

Attitudes Change:
Wave 1 to Wave 3
-2.604**
(1.155)
-0.206
(0.181)
0.690**
(0.300)
1.037

(0.736)

[0.716]

(0.849)

(0.648)

(0.733)

Table D. Effect of Risk Aversion, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Perceptions
Perceptions
Perceptions
Perceptions:
Perceptions:
Perceptions:
Change: Wave 1 Change: Wave 2
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
to Wave 2
to Wave 3
Treatment
0.645
-0.168
2.854*
-0.792
2.400
(1.240)
(1.201)
(1.610)
(1.454)
(2.020)
Risk
0.473**
0.398**
0.140
-0.122
-0.248
Aversion
(0.187)
(0.184)
(0.251)
(0.220)
(0.315)
Interaction
-0.179
0.020
-0.667
0.208
-0.543
(0.320)
(0.310)
(0.418)
(0.375)
(0.525)
Constant
1.203*
1.473**
2.176**
0.459
0.676
(0.710)
(0.699)
(0.951)
(0.832)
(1.193)
Observations
Adjusted R2

277
0.017

303
0.015

174
0.010

277
-0.010

174
0.013

(0.683)

Perceptions
Change: Wave 1 to
Wave 3
2.050
(1.628)
-0.272
(0.253)
-0.454
(0.424)
0.756
(0.958)
173
0.024

Note: Dependent variable is additive index for severity and transmissibility of COVID-19. Treatment denotes exposure of
treatment group to video stimuli. Risk aversion scale abbreviated from Weber, Blais, and Betz1. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Observations
Adjusted R2

275
0.025

300
0.036

174
0.025

273
-0.004

173
-0.016

173
0.014

Note: Dependent variable is respondent desire for others to socially distance due to COVID-19. Treatment denotes exposure of
treatment group to video stimuli. Risk aversion scale abbreviated from Weber, Blais, and Betz1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Efron2 variant standard errors in brackets to account for heteroskedastic residual structure. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table E. Effect of Conspiratorial Thinking, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Behaviors
Behavior
Behavior
Behaviors:
Behaviors:
Behaviors:
Change: Wave 1 Change: Wave 2
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
to Wave 2
to Wave 3
Treatment
0.576
0.279
0.758**
0.357
0.047
(0.377)
[0.388]
[0.328]
(0.236)
[0.285]
Conspiratorial
***
***
***
-0.436
-0.431
-0.407
0.025
-0.013
Thinking
(0.085)
[0.089]
[0.082]
(0.053)
[0.050]
Interaction
-0.215
-0.070
-0.285**
-0.179**
0.001
(0.138)
[0.163]
[0.132]
(0.089)
[0.122]
Constant
1.134***
1.049***
1.031***
-0.114
0.053
(0.232)
[0.218]
[0.200]
(0.145)
[0.125]
Observations
Adjusted R2

177
0.251

163
0.195

176
0.248

161
0.022

161
-0.016

Behavior Change:
Wave 1 to Wave
3
0.163
(0.206)
0.020
(0.047)
-0.061
(0.076)
-0.085
(0.127)
176
-0.013

Note: Dependent variable is predicted latent factor of COVID-19 behaviors. Treatment denotes exposure of treatment group to
video stimuli. Conspiratorial ideation scale abbreviated from Brotherton, French, and Pickering3. Standard errors in parentheses.
Efron2 variant standard errors in brackets to account for heteroskedastic residual structure. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
3.Brotherton R, French CC, Pickering AD. Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale.
Frontiers in Psychology. 2013:4(1):279. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279.
Table F. Effect of Conspiratorial Thinking, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Knowledge
Knowledge Knowledge: Knowledge: Knowledge
Knowledge Change:
: Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Change: Wave 1 to Wave 2 to Wave 3

Knowledge
Change: Wave 1

Treatment
Conspiratorial
Thinking
Interaction
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.357
(0.581)

0.103
(0.566)

0.226
(0.539)

Wave 2
0.359
(0.539)

0.097
[0.608]

to Wave 3
0.506
(0.473)

-0.883***

-0.595***

-0.758***

0.289**

-0.160

0.106

(0.136)
0.211
(0.213)
5.278***
(0.369)

(0.131)
0.093
(0.210)
4.838***
(0.353)

(0.125)
-0.006
(0.198)
5.302***
(0.339)

(0.126)
-0.108
(0.200)
-0.386
(0.342)

[0.101]
-0.057
[0.261]
0.421
[0.273]

(0.110)
-0.198
(0.173)
0.071
(0.299)

170
0.253

162
0.159

174
0.257

156
0.024

161
0.008

169
-0.010

Table G. Effect of Conspiratorial Thinking, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Attitudes
Attitudes
Attitudes:
Attitudes:
Attitudes:
Attitudes Change:
Change:Wave 2 to
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 1 to Wave 2
Wave 3
Treatment
1.366**
0.411
1.075**
-0.754
0.569
[0.607]
(0.653)
[0.531]
(0.600)
(0.550)
Conspiratorial
***
***
***
-0.539
-0.448
-0.432
0.116
0.002
Thinking
[0.176]
(0.151)
[0.143]
(0.140)
(0.127)
Interaction
-0.441*
-0.052
-0.355
0.261
-0.215
[0.241]
(0.243)
[0.216]
(0.223)
(0.204)
Constant
4.811***
4.731***
4.824***
-0.090
0.065
[0.445]
(0.407)
[0.349]
(0.376)
(0.343)
Table H. Effect of Conspiratorial Thinking, Treatment, and their Interaction on COVID-19 Perceptions
Perceptions
Perceptions
Perceptions:
Perceptions:
Perceptions:
Change: Wave 1 Change: Wave 2
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
to Wave 2
to Wave 3
Treatment
1.319*
-0.373
-0.398
-1.315
-0.014
(0.675)
(0.718)
(0.707)
(0.832)
(0.932)
Conspiratorial
-0.299*
-0.404**
-0.339**
0.007
0.125
Thinking
(0.152)
(0.166)
(0.159)
(0.192)
(0.215)
Interaction
-0.491**
0.146
0.208
0.464
0.085
(0.247)
(0.267)
(0.259)
(0.310)
(0.346)
Constant
3.679***
3.956***
3.614***
0.023
-0.523
(0.414)
(0.448)
(0.434)
(0.519)
(0.582)
Observations
Adjusted R2

176
0.090

165
0.026

177
0.013

164
0.006

165
-0.010

Attitudes Change:
Wave 1 to Wave
3
-0.318
(0.507)
0.093
(0.118)
0.099
(0.187)
0.041
(0.318)

Perceptions
Change: Wave 1
to Wave 3
-1.699**
(0.734)
-0.041
(0.165)
0.686**
(0.269)
-0.065
(0.450)
176
0.035

Note: Dependent variable is additive index for severity and transmissibility of COVID-19. Treatment denotes exposure of
treatment group to video stimuli. Conspiratorial ideation scale abbreviated from Brotherton, French, and Pickering3. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Observations
Adjusted R2

175
0.174

164
0.083

176
0.135

163
0.016

164
-0.008

175
-0.003

Note: Dependent variable is respondent desire for others to socially distance due to COVID-19. Treatment denotes exposure of
treatment group to video stimuli. Conspiratorial ideation scale abbreviated from Brotherton, French, and Pickering3. Standard errors
in parentheses. Efron2 variant in parentheses. Efron2 variant standard errors in brackets to account for heteroskedastic residual
structure. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

